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Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, and
Educational Choice: What Does Our
Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?
Michael W. McConnell'
What kind of education is needed to form citizens in this kind
of republic? By "this kind of republic," I mean a nation with lib-
eral democratic principles and a broad diversity of cultures, reli-
gions and moralities, racial and ethnic groups, beliefs, tastes, and
needs. One answer to the question goes under the banner of "mul-
ticultural education"-an education that recognizes the cultures of
the diverse peoples of America rather than focusing solely on the
core culture of the mainstream. Another answer, based on the ideal
of a "common education," seeks to bridge our differences and pro-
mote a common core of values important to American citizenship.
In this paper, I intend to show that under the rubric of "multicul-
turalism" there exist two diametrically opposed philosophies of ed-
ucation; that one of them does not deserve the name "multicul-
turalism" because it is essentially the substitution of a new moral-
cultural norm in place of the traditional one; that the other has
considerable merit and at the same time poses great risks; and that
the debate over multicultural education bears strong resemblance
to, and would profit by comparison with, the debate over disestab-
lishment of religion in the American states in the early days of the
Republic. The education best suited to the American republic, like
the religion best suited to the American republic, is based on the
principle of diversity and choice.
I. THE Two VERSIONS OF MULTICULTURALISM
To know what kind of education we should have we need to
know what kind of citizens we are educating. Are we educating citi-
zens with a common understanding of the public good, based on a
common curriculum and a common education? Or are we educat-
ing citizens with primary commitments to their particular cultural,
political, ethnic, and religious understandings of the good?
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
124 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
One version of "multiculturalism" is essentially a call for re-
form of the common curriculum. Proponents urge introduction
into the curriculum of materials from the perspectives of groups
outside the mainstream of traditional Western culture, particularly
Third World writers, feminists, gays and lesbians, persons of color,
the poor and dispossessed, and the radical left. The other version
of "multiculturalism" is a call for abandonment of a common cur-
riculum. Students from different cultures and backgrounds should
be given different educations, allowing the diverse groups of
America to pass on their cultures and traditions to succeeding gen-
erations and to avoid assimilation into the common culture of
mainstream America.
Both versions of multiculturalism are critical of the common
curriculum of the past, which they see as narrow and parochial at
best, if not Eurocentric, male-dominated, and repressive. But the
first wishes to substitute its own common curriculum, while the
second wishes to institute different curricula for different students.
The first wishes to form citizens in a particular way, according to a
particular ideal of what a citizen should be like. The second wishes
to form citizens in different ways, according to the different ideals
that are found in the different cultures of America.
The first version is not truly multiculturalism at all. It is an
attempt to substitute an alternative culture-an adversary cul-
ture-in place of the mainstream traditional culture. The reason
this version is so influential among educators is that the children
of the adversary culture of the 1960s are now in power in educa-
tional institutions and they, like power elites before them, intend
to use the instrument of education to promote their understanding
of the public good. There is nothing inherently wrong with using
education in this manner, but they should not be allowed to pre-
vail on the false claim that the culture they present is more di-
verse, open, pluralistic, or multicultural. It is just as prone to nar-
rowness and intolerance as anything that has come before.' A
simple test of this proposition is to ask: how often do the advocates
of this form of "multiculturalism" speak up for inclusion of per-
spectives at odds with their own?
The educational program of the adversary culture should be
evaluated according to two criteria. First, are the aspects of culture
they seek to introduce superior to those they would displace? It is
1 I do not speak here of the professedly non-controversial version of multiculturalism
advocated by Robert Fullinwider elsewhere in this volume. See Robert K. Fullinwider, Mul-
ticultural Education, 1991 U Chi Legal F 75.
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possible, indeed likely, that some items in the accepted "canon"
are less worthy than works from less familiar sources. It may well
be that parochialism and prejudice played a part in past selections,
and that the curriculum could be improved by a more self-con-
sciously inclusive commitment to excellence. Even so, important
works by white male writers should not be replaced by works of
non-whites and women simply because of those characteristics.
Second, are the aspects of culture they seek to introduce more
broadening than those they would replace? Excellence is not the
only standard for education; it is important, as well, to broaden the
minds of the students by introducing ideas and perspectives that
challenge the students' own predilections. The program of those
who call themselves multiculturalists may on occasion serve this
end; but in many instances it seems more likely that they will rein-
force the political orthodoxies that are already dominant among
college students, at the expense of other perspectives (for example,
the perspectives of classical or biblical antiquity) that are genu-
inely challenging and unfamiliar. Does anyone really think that
Toni Morrison's Beloved presents a greater challenge to the
zeitgeist than, say, Augustine's City of God?
It may also be asked, especially at the elementary and second-
ary level, by what right the new educational elite seeks to impose
its cultural and ideological preferences on the children of society as
a whole. If there is to be a common curriculum, isn't it more fair
and more democratic for that curriculum to reflect the preferences
of the mainstream rather than the adversary preferences of a well-
positioned fringe?
In any event, disputes of this sort proceed within the tradition
of a common curriculum. Whichever side is correct (and perhaps
the truth lies somewhere in between) the outcome will not be mul-
ticultural in any serious sense. Teachers have neither the time nor
the expertise to impart serious knowledge about the multitudes of
cultures extant in America. Choices must be made, and the result,
by definition, cannot be neutral toward all.
The more radical challenge to the status quo-the true mul-
ticultural challenge-comes from those who deny the very desira-
bility of a common curriculum and advocate a pluralistic system of
schools dedicated to particular, and particularistic, traditions,
some of which will foster cultures and moral norms at variance
from those in the wider society (whether mainstream or adver-
sary). The most dramatic example is the demand in some quarters
for an "Afrocentric" education that would emphasize the culture
123]
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and values of African-Americans, such as has been initiated in Mil-
waukee, New York, Seattle, and other cities.2
This version of multiculturalism could be accomplished fairly
and pragmatically by a comprehensive system of educational
choice-a system commonly known as "vouchers," in which par-
ents would be free to choose among available accredited schools,
instead of being limited to the schools provided by the elected
school board. Each student would be entitled to his or her per-
pupil share of educational funds (adjusted for educational need
and other factors). Instead of making educational decisions collec-
tively by an elected school board, we would allow diversity and
choice, within appropriate limits set by accreditation standards.'
Under such a system, the distinction between "public" and "pri-
vate" schools would collapse.' Schools would become like grocery
stores under a comprehensive system of Food Stamps: privately
operated, privately chosen, and (in large part) publicly funded.
The two essential features of educational choice plans are (1)
schools must have the autonomy necessary to create distinctive
curricula; and (2) parents and their children must be free to choose
among the schools, carrying their per-pupil allotment of tax-gener-
' See, for example, Dirk Johnson, Milwaukee Creating 2 Schools for Black Boys, NY
Times 1 (Sept 30, 1990); Terry Tang, The African American Academy-Separatism For
Success-An Afrocentric Focus in a New Seattle Pilot Program, Seattle Times A21 (Mar
17, 1991). Schools with other varieties of ethnic focus have also been started. Seattle, for
example, has Native American, Gypsy, and Hispanic schools as well as Afrocentric schools.
Id.
I In such a system, accreditation standards are needed to ensure that the schools are
bona fide educational institutions, but they must not be so prescriptive as to frustrate edu-
cational choice. In my opinion, the beat plan would be to use standardized testing to ensure
that schools are producing positive results, rather than to institute particular requirements
regarding curricular materials, staff, or educational plant, other than those pertaining to
health and safety.
" Some jurisdictions, like Minnesota, have instituted educational choice plans solely
within the public school system. Limiting choice to the public schools, however, undermines
the multicultural effect by excluding truly distinctive schools, especially religious schools,
and institutes in effect a political veto on educational diversity. It is difficult to understand
either the justice of or the pedagogical justification for this discrimination.
Some have suggested that private schools should not participate because they do not
have the obligation to serve all students, and might discriminate on invidious grounds. But
these concerns are not a sufficient basis for a categorical exclusion. First, rather than ex-
clude all private schools, it would be better to exclude only those that do not comply with
an appropriate nondiscrimination requirement. Second, a sensible system would not require
all schools to serve all types of student; one of the practical advantages of the program is to
allow specialization. The problem of hard-to-educate children is better solved by the market
solution of differential per-pupil allotments than by command-and-control regulation. Fi-
nally, to the extent that the argument against inclusion of private schools rests on the fear
that aid to religious schools would be unconstitutional, these fears are probably groundless
under current and emerging precedent. See pages 139-49, below.
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ated financial support with them. (Of course, laws prohibiting ra-
cial discrimination in private education would continue to apply.')
An ideal system would adjust the per-pupil allotment upward for
hard-to-educate children (those with handicaps or other special
needs, those from disadvantaged backgrounds, and so forth), to
create an incentive for schools to develop programs to meet their
needs. These adjustments could facilitate social and racial integra-
tion,6 while the system as a whole Would foster efficient
specialization.
Under such a system, the large majority would probably
choose some version of education within the majoritarian culture.
The primary effect (other than a salutary spur of competition,
which automatically comes from consumer sovereignty) would be
the emergence of schools specializing in particular areas: math and
science academies, language academies, traditional "three Rs"
schools, schools with strong programs in art and drama, schools
with special pedagogical philosophies (like Montessori schools),
and the like. But if current trends are any indication, a significant
minority will choose to educate their children within a different
culture. There will be more religious schools, and among these, the
cost salient will be from religious traditions at odds with main-
stream American culture (fundamentalist and evangelical schools,
Catholic schools, Islamic schools, Orthodox and Conservative Jew-
ish schools, Mormon schools, Hindu schools). There will be more
schools from an identifiable ideological perspective (feminist
schools, progressive schools). And there will be more ethnic or ra-
cial schools, including Hispanic schools, some Asian schools, and
(as the experience in Milwaukee shows), Afrocentric schools.
Adoption of a genuine multiculturalism, however, would pose
great risks. There is a danger that, when freed from the cultural
and moral norms of the wider society, subgroups might develop
curricula that are morally repugnant or substantively inferior. Tel-
evision advertisements opposing the educational choice recently re-
' See Runyon v McCrary, 427 US 160, 161 (1976) (42 USC § 1981 prohibits racial dis-
crimination in admission to private schools).
I It might be argued that, to prevent socio-economic stratification, parents should be
forbidden to supplement the governmental subvention with private tuition. Such restric-
tions should be resisted, however, both because, in my opinion, it is the parents' right (and
moral obligation) to do what they can to improve their children's education, however they
can, and also because it is socially useful for private individuals to devote more resources to
education, which produces substantial benefits to society as a whole. If socio-economic strat-
ification turns out to be a problem, a better solution would be to require each school to
accept a certain percentage of its student body (50 percent?) without supplemental tuition.
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jected by voters in Oregon7 for example, effectively (although mis-
leadingly) featured classrooms in which students and teachers
huddled in Ku Klux Klan robes. The message was that with educa-
tional choice, some would make evil choices.
Commentators have called Milwaukee's special schools for
black males "nothing less than an experiment in racism and sex-
ism."' A group of eminent historians charged that the attempt in
New York to make the history curriculum more "inclusive" would
undermine and politicize the teaching of history.9 In a thoughtful
essay elsewhere in this volume, Robert Fullinwider warns that
Afrocentric studies "are as much about creating as reclaiming a
culture,"10 that they "may purvey dubious or spurious lessons and
grind special ideological axes,""1 that they sometimes "argue for
witchcraft and magic (African) as legitimate alternatives to science
and reason,"12 and that they may provide excuses for demanding
less of black students with respect to both learning and
discipline."3
More fundamentally, critics of multiculturalism warn that it
will undermine the civic purpose of common education. In Fullin-
wider's words, multicultural education "fosters a sense of differ-
ence where there is already too much; it obscures or denies what
unites us; it undermines rather than aids induction into a common
'civic culture.' "1' In a nation riven by racial, ethnic, and religious
'divisions, it is said, we need most of all an education that will
soften our differences and establish a common core. This serious
claim marks the ground on which the debate over multiculturalism
must proceed.
A review of the historical arguments and approaches is in-
structive in the context of today's debates over multiculturalism.
For a description of the plan, see William Celis III, Education: Oregon Considers Tax
Credits To Aid Private Schooling, NY Times Al (Aug 22, 1990).
8 Bruce Fein and William Bradford Reynolds, Milwaukee's Racist School Experiment,
Legal Times 24 (Nov 12, 1990).
9 Diane Ravitch and Arthur Schlesinger, NY Should Teach History, Not Ethnic Cheer-
leading, Newsday 77 (June 29, 1990).
10 Fullinwider, 1990 U Chi Legal F at 85 (cited in note 1).
Id at 86.
Id.
Id at 86-87.
Fullinwider, 1990 U Chi Legal F at 88.
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II. MULTICULTURALISM AT THE FOUNDING
The Founders of the American republic were ambivalent
about multiculturalism, just as we are today, although they did not
use the same vocabulary to talk about it. Culture is not simply a
matter of style and aesthetics; it is more fundamentally about what
kind of people, with what kind of character, we are to be. Culture
is bound up in morality, and no state can be indifferent to the
question of morality. Our Founders addressed these matters in
terms of the civic republican tradition, the central theme of which
was the need for what they called public "virtue"-a commitment
to the common good without bias in favor of one's own interests.
In a monarchy, public order could be maintained by coercion and
hierarchy. In a republic, the people themselves must desire to live
together in harmony, for the people rule themselves. As Gordon
Wood has explained, summarizing the dominant opinion of the
founding period:
In a monarchy each man's desire to do what was right in
his own eyes could be restrained by fear or force. In a
republic, however, each man must somehow be persuaded
to submerge his personal wants into the greater good of
the whole . . . . A republic was such a delicate polity
precisely because it demanded an extraordinary moral
character in the people. Every state in which the people
participated needed a degree of virtue; but a republic
which rested solely on the people absolutely required it."5
Division of moral opinion or, worse yet, unbridled individualistic
self-interestedness, would lead quickly to disintegration and anar-
chy in a republic. In the civic republicanism of the founding period
we hear the same persuasive theme that is sounded today in sup-
port of a common education: in a nation as diverse and potentially
disorderly as America, we need a civic culture and hence an educa-
tion that brings us together and reinforces the public good.1"
11 Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 68 (Norton,
1969).
" The connection between republicanism and education was drawn most clearly by
Montesquieu:
It is in a republican government that the whole power of education is required.
The fear of despotic governments naturally arises of itself amidst threats and pun-
ishments; ... but virtue is a self-renunciation, which is ever arduous and painful.
This virtue may be defined as the love of the laws and of our country. As such love
requires a constant preference of public to private interest, it is the source of all
private virtue; for they are nothing more than this very preference itself. This love
123]
130 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
Yet the best minds of the founding generation were aware that
there could be no "virtuous republic"-no nation with a common
commitment to a common ideal-in a continent as vast as
America. The political science of their day demonstrated that the
preconditions for this kind of republic could exist only in a small
jurisdiction with a homogeneous population. 17 "In a republic," ac-
cording to "Brutus," a leading Antifederalist pamphleteer, "the
manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar.
If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of opin-
ions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striv-
ing against those of the other."' 8 A more expansive territory would
deny the citizens the opportunity of knowing one another and of
participating in the formation of the laws; it would thus undermine
their public spiritedness, personal attachment to the laws, and
common feeling. An extended union would also contain more het-
erogeneous opinions and interests, which would tend toward divi-
sion. There could be no common understanding of the public good
in a large and diverse nation, and hence no true republican
virtue. 9
This conundrum was the heart of the ratification debate in
1787. If it were true that republican government requires an ex-
traordinary degree of public virtue and that public virtue can exist
is peculiar to democracies. In these alone the government is intrusted to private
citizens. Now, a government is like every thing else: to preserve it we must love it
.... Every thing, therefore, depends on establishing this love in a republic; and
to inspire it ought to be the principal business of education.
Baron de Montesquieu, 1 The Spirit of the Laws bk 4, ch 5 at 34 (1748, reprinted by Hafner
Press, 1949) (paragraph divisions omitted).
7 See, generally, Herbert J. Storing,- What the Anti-Federalists Were For 15-23 (U of
Chicago Press, 1981). Montesquieu was the most frequently cited authority:
It is natural for a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise it cannot long
subsist .... In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand
private views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small
one, the interest of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more within
the reach of every citizen; abuses have less extent, and, of course, are less
protected.
Montesquieu, 1 The Spirit of the Laws bk 8, ch 16 at 120.
S Brutus, Essays of Brutus, New York Journal (Oct 18, 1787), reprinted in Herbert J.
Storing, ed, 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 369 (U of Chicago Press, 1981).
", The seeds of American nativism can thus be detected in the civic republican ideol-
ogy. See, for example, Agrippa, Letters of Agrippa, Massachusetts Gazette (Dec 28, 1787),
reprinted in Storing, ed, 4 Complete Anti-Federalist at 85-86 (arguing against federal power
of naturalization, citing the example of Pennsylvania, whose pro-immigration policy had led
to a decline in "morals, education, [and] energy," in contrast to the New England states,
which had "by keeping separate from the foreign mixtures, acquired, their present great-
ness"). The opposition to the moral culture of immigrant groups would later strongly influ-
ence the common school movement. See text accompanying notes 42-44.
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in this sense only in a small territory, then according to the Anti-
federalists, the new federal government could not be a republic,
but would inevitably tend toward some form of aristocracy or op-
pression. Significantly, the defenders of the Constitution did not
take issue with this syllogism on its own terms. Rather, they ar-
gued-most prominently in Madison's essays in The Federalist,
Numbers 10 and 51-that institutional balance would pit differ-
ences of opinion and interests against each other in such a way
that it would substitute for public virtue as a means of protecting
liberty.20 It would not be a homogeneous moral culture, but a mul-
tiplicity of factions, that would protect against oppression. When
the people agreed with. Federalist 10 and 51 and voted to establish
the federal government, they were by sheer force of geography
committing themselves to a'multicultural polity. They knew this
course was risky. That is why the Antifederalists almost won.
The debate over multiculturalism reached its culmination in
the Religion Clauses of the,. First Amendment. The logic of the
civic republican position suggested Ithat some support for religion
was necessary in order to foster public virtue. Washington's Fare-
well Address was perhaps the most eloquent statement of this po-
sition: "Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political
prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports ....
And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can
be maintained without religion. '21 This position was widely shared,
for it seemed inconceivable that morality could flourish without
the support of religion.22 Thus, in the crisis of national self-exami-
nation that occurred in the mid-1780s, when public virtue seemed
at a dangerously low ebb, efforts -were undertaken in many states
to provide public subvention for religion.2" The argument for these
measures was political (civic republican) rather than religious. The
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, for example, justified its min-
'0 Federalist 10 and 51 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 77,
320 (Mentor, 1961).
"1 Henry Steele Commager, ed, Documents of American History 169, 173 (Meredith,
7th ed 1963).
22 See Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For at 22-23; Wood, The Creation of
the American Republic at 427-28 (cited in note 15).
" Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont already had ministerial
taxes; in Georgia, a law providing for ministerial taxes was passed in the legislature, al-
though apparently never went into effect; in Maryland, ministerial taxes were authorized by
the state constitution but never enafted by the legislature; in Virginia, a proposal for minis-
terial taxes was widely debated and defeated in the' General Assembly. See Thomas J.
Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the First
Amendment 134-192 (Oxford U Press, 1986).
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isterial taxes on the ground that "the happiness of a people and
the good order and preservation of civil government essentially de-
pend on piety, religion, and morality, ' 24 and the Northwest Ordi-
nance provided that "[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge [are] nec-
essary to good government." 25
But the perceived need for support for religion came into con-
flict with what was coming to be a more central feature of Ameri-
can constitutionalism: the liberty of conscience. The right of each
individual to worship God in accordance with his own faith and
convictions precluded any attempt to enforce religious duties by
the instrument of law. The diversity of religious opinion was too
great for the Founders to reach any agreement on the religious
principles to be supported by the State. Accordingly, from the be-
ginning the new federal government 'was forbidden to establish any
religion or to interfere with the right of free exercise, and the re-
maining state establishments were gradually dismantled (Massa-
chusetts's being the last to go, in 1833).2
Thus, as Charles Kesler observes in his essay elsewhere in this
volume, the nation founded in 1787 was not a polis-not a nation
organized around a common understanding of the good. The Foun-
ders "knew they could not have built such a narrow, soaring struc-
ture because they lacked the keystone, the absolutely essential and
binding part: the gods. '27 Under the First Amendment, we are
committed to the proposition that the citizens will believe in dif-
ferent gods, or at least different understandings of the same God.
The First Amendment singles out religion for special attention not
because it is unimportant-although it is easy to be tolerant and
broad-minded about unimportant things-but because religion is
so very important to individual character, and thus to public cul-
ture and morality. Our Constitution is therefore a multicultural
constitution.
From a comfortable distance in time, it may be difficult to ap-
preciate how radical an experiment this was. No nation had ever
24 Francis Newton Thorpe, 3 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters,
and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, & Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming
the United States of America 1889 (US Gov't Printing Office, 1909).
"6 Robert M. Taylor, Jr., ed, The Northwest Ordinance, 1787: A Bicentennial Hand-
book 61 (Indiana Historical Society, 1987).
'6 See Sanford H. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America 510-17 (MacMillan,
1902, reprinted in 1970); Anson Phelps Stokes and Leo Pfeffer, Church and State in the
United States, 77-78 (Harper & Row, rev ed 1964).
"' Charles R. Kesler, Education and Politics: Lessons from the American Founding,
1991 U Chi Legal F 101, 105.
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been founded without a unifying religion. The Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment meant that we would not have a common
civic culture at the most fundamental level. We would not have a
common morality. We would not have a common understanding of
our relations to one another. We would not be joined in the feeling
of fellowship that comes with membership in a common commu-
nity of faith.
The Constitution thus left a dangerous void. Left to their own
devices, the various religious sects might propagate all manner of
pernicious doctrines. At the very least, the clergy might stir up the
followers in antagonism to one another, making civic harmony vir-
tually unattainable. Jefferson commented of the Presbyterian
clergy: "they are violent, ambitious of power, and intolerant in
politics as in religion and want nothing but license from the laws to
kindle again the fires of their leader John Knox, and to give us a
2d blast from his trumpet."2 According to their detractors, Bap-
tists were worse: fanatical, ignorant, disruptive, and divisive.2 If a
civic moral culture is necessary for a pluralistic republic, and if
churches are the primary instruments for the spread of morality,
then our Founders might have been forgiven for concluding that an
established church-or at the least, substantial government control
over private churches-was the more prudent course.
Yet they took the risk. And it turned out that giving free rein
to private institutions for the propagation of moral culture was not
so dangerous after all. Secure in their own rights, and stripped of
the potentiality of imposing their dogmas onto the wider society
through public institutions, the religious groups of America settled
into a harmonious competition, with the result that religion is
stronger and more influential in this country than .in virtually any
nation of Western Europes°-presumably performing its civic func-
tion of promoting public virtue more effectively than if it had been
established by the state.
28 Adrienne Koch and William Peden, eds, The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas
Jefferson 697 (Modern Library, 1944).
" Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790 173-75, 193 (U of North Car-
olina Press, 1982) (describing the reaction of Virginia gentry to the Baptists); Daniel J.
Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experience 135-36 (Random House, 1958) (Virginia
reactions to New Light Presbyterians and Separate Baptists, who were frequently jailed for
disturbing the peace).
80 Richard John Neuhaus, ed, Unsecular America 115-127 (Wim B. Eerdmans, 1986)
(appendix reproducing the results of various cross-national surveys of religious affiliation
and conviction).
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The history of religious pluralism is closely related to the issue
of educational pluralism for two reasons. First, education has al-
ways been closely related to religion. Until well into the nineteenth
century, most schools (primary through college) were connected
with churches or religious orders, most teachers were clergy, and
the curriculum was a mixture of classicism and Christianity. This
century's abandonment of serious religious instruction in primary
, and secondary schools has been a significant contributing factor in
the secularization of American life. Second, the moral-cultural role
of primary and secondary schools today closely resembles that of
churches at the time of the founding. Today, it is the schools to
which society looks as the principal instruments for inculcation of
public virtue-for solutions to problems such as drug use, racism,
poor self-esteem, imprudent sexual conduct, and the like. It is not
surprising, then, that disagreements over the content of public ed-
ucation are as prominent today as arguments over the content of
public religion were two hundred years ago. The hard question is
whether a similar solution-individual freedom-will be adopted.
III. THE COMMON SCHOOL MOVEMENT
Multiculturalism, especially in the form of religious diversity,
posed a problem for public education from the beginning. As Diane
Ravitch has pointed out, public support for education was insti-
tuted first in parts of the country, such as New England, that were
relatively homogeneous in religion. 1 Education was inseparable
from religion, and where there was diversity in religion it was diffi-
cult to achieve consensus regarding education. As the need for gov-
ernmental support for education came to be perceived as more
pressing, jurisdictions with numerous contending religious sects
were faced with two models of education. First, the government
could provide financial support to a diverse range of privately ad-
ministered schools, including schools of the various denominations.
The states followed this pattern in the early nineteenth century.32
Alternatively, the government could provide financial support ex-
clusively to common schools-schools that would, theoretically, ed-
ucate all the children of the jurisdiction without divisions along
religious, cultural, or economic lines. The latter-championed by
8, Diane Ravitch, The Great School Wars, New York City, 1805-1973: A History of the
Public Schools as Battlefield of Social Change 6-7 (Basic Books, 1974).
81 Id at 7. See also Carl F. Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and
American Society, 1780-1860 57, 166-67 (Hill & Wang, 1983) (specifically addressing New
York City's schools).
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such noted reformers as Horace Mann-became the universal pat-
tern in the United States after the Civil War.88
The arguments for the common school movement closely fol-
lowed the traditional position of civic republicanism. The schools
would serve to eliminate distinctions of wealth, ethnic origin, and
religion, and thus promote the assimilative goals of "American-
ism." "The children of this country, of whatever parentage, should
. . . be educated together,-be educated, not as Baptists, or Meth-
odists, or Episcopalians, or Presbyterians; not as Roman Catholics
or Protestants, still less as foreigners in language or spirit, but as
Americans, as made of one blood and citizens of the same free
country,-educated to be one harmonious people." '
The early nineteenth century, pluralistic system lost favor af-
ter the Civil War because it perpetuated differences in language
and religion and retarded the inculcation of American values
among the newly arrived immigrant classes.8 5 In addition to its al-
truistic motivations, the common school movement was also tinged
with nativism and anti-Catholic prejudice.8 6 Some argued it was
necessary to confine funding to public schools because a pluralistic
funding system would "drive the children of foreigners, and espe-
cially of Roman Catholics, into clans by themselves, where igno-
rance and prejudice respecting the native population, and a spirit
remote from the American, and hostile to the Protestant, will be
3' See Stokes & Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States at 422-25 (cited in note
26).
W.S. Dutton, The Proposed Substitution of Sectarian for Public Schools, Common
School Journal 166-68 (June 1, 1848), quoted in Charles L. Glenn, Jr., The Myth of the
Common School 223 (U of Massachusetts Press, 1987).
" See Glenn, The Myth of the Common School at 230-34; Kaestle, Pillars of the Re-
public at 163-64; Ravitch, The Great School Wars at 67 (describing efforts of nativist
groups to defeat funding of Catholic schools).
" One prominent defender of the public school monopoly, a Congregationalist minister,
described the common school as "a Protestant institution-associated with all our religious
convictions, opinions, and the public sentiment of our Protestant Society." He warned that
students in parochial schools are "instructed mainly into the foreign prejudices and super-
stitions of their fathers," commenting that "the state . . . will pay the bills!" Life and Let-
ters of Horace Bushnell 299-303 (Harper & Bros., 1880), quoted in Glenn, The Myth of the
Common School at 227, 229. A Congregationalist newspaper called "the present system" of
common schools "an important check against Romanism." Id at 231-32. The Catholic at-
tempt in Philadelphia to allow substitution of the Douay Bible and excusal from other reli-
gious exercises inspired anti-Catholic demonstrations and riots in which thirteen persons
were killed and St. Augustine's Church was burned. Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic at 170.
Fear or resentment of other minority religious groups also contributed to the defeat of
pluralistic education finance. See, for example, Glenn, The Myth of the Common School at
193 (quoting Horace Mann's warning that if the public system supports religious schools,
"how long would it be, before we should have schools for the Come-outers, for the Millerites,
and the Mormonites?").
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fostered in them. ' s7 Common school advocates, like Mann, made
no secret of their hope that, deprived of any share of public funds,
religious schools would be forced to shut down. 8
Thus, despite insistent demands by minority groups, princi-
pally Catholics, but including Jews, Presbyterians, Baptists, and
Methodists,," for equal funding for their free schools, the common
school movement soon achieved a monopoly of public funding.
Many states even adopted constitutional provisions barring state
funding of religious schools,' 0 and a federal constitutional amend-
ment to that effect was narrowly defeated in Congress.41 The oppo-
sition to particularistic private schools grew to the extent that, in
the early twentieth century, some states passed laws forbidding the
education of children in languages other than English and banning
private schools altogether. These efforts were promptly overturned
by the Supreme Court, on the ground that "[t]he fundamental the-
ory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose ex-
cludes any general power of the State to standardize its children
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."' 2
The cases brought into sharp relief the conflict between a multicul-
tural constitution and the civic republican educational system,
which was predicated on the assumption that there is a single
"American" culture into which all citizens should be assimilated.
To its core, the common school movement was dedicated to the
very program the Court deemed unconstitutional: the "standardi-
zation" of the nation's children through common education.
" Glenn, The Myth of the Common School at 224 (quoting W.S. Dutton).
" See id at 219-22.
11 In 1813, these groups petitioned for and received a share of the New York school
fund. See Jonathan D. Sarna, American Jews and Church State Relations: The Search for
"Equal Footing" 6-7 (American Jewish Committee, 1989). The petition of Shearith Israel
appealed to "the liberal spirit of our constitution" in support of pluralistic funding. Id at 7.
In the great controversy over public funding in New York in 1840, Jewish and Presbyterian
schools joined Catholics in requesting funding, and Jews were the only religious group not to
join in the "general attack on the Catholics" that ensued. Ravitch, The Great School Wars
at 40, 53 (cited in note 31). This effort proved unsuccessful and public funds were thereafter
confined to "nonsectarian" public schools in New York. For a detailed account of the 1840
controversy, see id at 33-76; see also Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic at 167-69 (cited in note
32).
40 See Stokes & Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States at 422-25 (cited in note
26).
,1 Id at 434.
Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 535 (1925) (striking down Oregon law out-
lawing private schools). See also Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923) (striking down Ne-
braska law outlawing foreign language education).
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The common school movement was explicitly anti-multicul-
tural, with respect to both culture in general and religion in partic-
ular. One opponent of funding of parochial schools testified that
"the task of absorbing and Americanizing these foreign masses...
can only be successfully overcome by a uniform system of Ameri-
can schools, teaching the same political creed" and assured the
Congress that this uniform system would "continue us" as "a
united, homogeneous people.
4
-
In addition to opposing diverse private schooling, the common
school movement sought to foster a common morality in the public
schools. A statement by one noted reformer argued that "what
above all things is wanted in every State in the Union" is "a moral
power which shall address itself to the highest faculties of the peo-
ple, and assist in forming and giving consistency and permanence
to opinion, and which. . . may serve, through the influence of rea-
son, to elevate, temper, and guide them all."" The Boston School
Committee explained that in the common schools, immigrant chil-
dren would "receive moral and religious teaching, powerful enough
if possible to keep them in the right path amid the moral darkness
which is their daily and domestic walk. '45
The common school movement was a self-conscious effort to
use education to foster the common culture, which of course had a
religious (Protestant) dimension. Horace Mann expressed this in-
tention as follows:
All those who are worthily laboring to promote the cause
of education are laboring to elevate mankind into the up-
per and purer regions of civilization, Christianity, and
the worship of the true God; all those who are ob-
structing the progress of this cause are impelling the race
backwards into barbarism and idolatry.'
This emphasis on moral education necessarily involved the schools
with religion. Indeed, the leaders of the common school movement
prided themselves on the extent of the religious education in their
48 Glenn, The Myth of the Common School at 252 (cited in note 34) (quoting a repre-
sentative of the anti-Catholic Evangelical Alliance).
,4 Horace Mann, Common School Journal 157-58 (May 15, 1841) (quoting George
Combe), cited in Glenn, The Myth of the Common School at 118.
48 Stanley K. Schultz, The Culture Factory: Boston Public Schools, 1789-1960 290 (Ox-
ford U Press, 1973), quoted in Glenn, The Myth of the Common School at 202. For an
account of the education of immigrants in New York City in a later period, see Ravitch, The
Great School Wars at 161-80 (cited in note 31).
' Horace Mann, Common School Journal 15 (Jan 1, 1846), quoted in Glenn, The Myth
of the Common School at 171-72.
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schools, which usually included Bible reading (typically the King
James version), "nonsectarian catechism," and other religious
exercises.' 7
But while the common school reformers imbued their systems
with religious exercises, they were equally insistent that these exer-
cises be "nonsectarian.""' In practice, this meant that the common
schools would teach those tenets of Protestant Christianity that
were most widely shared, and exclude those doctrines about which
there was serious disagreement.'9 The result was a watered-down
piety closely resembling liberal Protestantism.50
To its detractors-principally Catholics, Jews, and so-called
"orthodox" Protestants-the system appeared both sectarian and
offensive."1 They could not understand why the religion of the lib-
eral elite ,should receive the support of public funds, while their
own schools received none. To its defenders, the system appeared
to steer a neutral course between the extremes of sectarianism and
irreligion.
'7 Ravitch, The Great School Wars at 18-19. See also Glenn, The Myth of the Common
School at 115 (one of Horace Mann's "proudest accomplishments [was] that the Bible was
more commonly read in school than before his efforts began"); and at 165 (quoting Mann's
statement that "the influences of the Board of Education have been the means of increasing,
to a great extent, the amount of religious instruction given in our schools").
,' While opposing introduction of what he called "sectarian instruction or sectarian
books" into the public schools, Horace Mann, Fourth Annual Report of the Secretary of the
Board 59 (Dutton & Wentworth, 1841), quoted in Glenn, The Myth of the Common School
at 164 (cited in note 34), Mann claimed that "[m]oral training, or the application of reli-
gious principles to the duties of life," should be the "inseparable accompaniment" to educa-
tion. Horace Mann, Ninth Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board 157 (Dutton &
Wentworth, 1846), quoted in Glenn, The Myth of the Common School at 165. See also
Glenn, Myth at 125, 168.
" See Glenn, The Myth of the Common School at 164 (cited in note 34) (quoting
Mann's statement that the schools should "draw the line between those views of religious
truth and of christian faith which are common to all, and may, therefore, with propriety be
inculcated in school, and those which, being peculiar to individual sects, are therefore by law
excluded"); and at 149, 155, 173.
60 See id at 132 ("By retaining only those aspects of Christianity with which Unitarians
agreed the proposed religious teaching was in fact identical with Unitarian teaching"); Ra-
vitch, The Great School Wars at 9 (cited in note 31) (the "nonsectarianism of the New York
Free School Society "was in reality nondenominational Protestantism"); Sarna, American
Jews at 19 (cited in note 39) ("Whatever their claims to the contrary, the schools then were
culturally Protestant.").
" See Sarna, American Jews at 18-19; Glenn, The Myth of the Common School at 179-
206; Ravitch, The Great School Wars at 35, 41-42, 45, 48-49, 53. Matthew Hale Smith, a
Protestant critic of the Massachusetts system, addressed Horace Mann in these terms: "Cer-
tain views that you entertain, you call religion, or 'piety.' These you allow to be taught in
schools. You enforce them in your lectures, reports, and Journal. Those which clash with
your particular views, you reject as 'dogmatic theology,' or 'sectarianism.'" Glenn, The
Myth of the Common School at 189.
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Some voices were raised in favor of a pluralistic alternative.
Governor Seward of New York, for example, recognized that
"prejudice arising from differences of language or religion" was re-
sponsible for the exclusion of many immigrant children from the
public schools."2 As a remedy, he proposed "the establishment of
schools in which they may be instructed by teachers speaking the
same language with themselves and professing the same faith.""
Raising still more fundamental questions, the Committee on Edu-
cation of the Massachusetts legislature, critical of Mann, argued
that nonsectarianism is "utterly impossible" because "religion and
politics, in this free country, are so intimately connected with
every other subject." 4 Even a book "upon politics, morals, or reli-
gion, containing no party or sectarian views," is not genuinely neu-
tral, for it will "be likely to leave the mind in a state of doubt and
skepticism, much more to be deplored than any party or sectarian
bias."5 6 The Committee argued that "[t]he right to mould the po-
litical, moral, and religious opinions of his children is a right exclu-
sively and jealously reserved by our laws to every parent; and for
the government to attempt, directly or indirectly, as to these mat-
ters, to stand in the parent's place, is an under-taking of very ques-
tionable policy."56 They therefore proposed that public funds
should be used to support a variety of schools, leaving the choice
among them to the families involved.5 7 Neither proposal was ulti-
mately adopted, and further progress was halted by the rising tide
of anti-immigrant feeling.
IV. THE RECENT HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL PLURALISM
After World War II, some states, especially in the Northeast,
began to explore ways to provide modest financial assistance to
nonpublic schools. The impetus for these measures stemmed from
three factors: (1) the decline in anti-Catholic prejudice, most dra-
matically symbolized by the election in 1960 of the nation's first
Catholic President, (2) economic considerations-principally the
strain on public school resources from the Baby Boom and cost
'2 William Oland Bourne, History of the Public School Society 179 (Wm. Wood & Co.,
1870), quoted in Ravitch, The Great School Wars at 37.
" Id.
" Common School Journal 228 (Aug 1, 1840), quoted in Glenn, The Myth of the Com-
mon School at 124 (cited in note 34).
8 Id at 125.
' Id at 122.
5 This position was also adopted by John Stuart Mill. See John Stuart Mill, On Lib-
erty 104-05 (Hackett, 1978).
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increases threatening the closing of many nonpublic schools-that
led to the realization that it is cheaper for the state to subsidize a
small part of nonpublic school costs than to absorb the children
into the public schools, and (3) the increasing political power of
groups that favor nonpublic schools.
In early court challenges, the Supreme Court upheld assis-
tance to nonpublic schools if, but only if, the aid took a secular
form. Thus, in Everson v Board of Educ.,8 the Court permitted
the state to pay for transportation to religious schools, and in
Board of Educ. v Allen," it permitted the state to pay for secular
textbooks (chosen from among those approved for use in the public
schools). While perceived as a victory for parochial schools, and
hence for pluralism in education, these decisions were in fact a se-
rious setback for pluralism. Public subsidies on the Court's terms
were a powerful inducement to homogeneity. Religious schools
could receive public money, but only at the cost of adopting the
secular curriculum of the public schools.
In later decisions, beginning in 1971, the Court effectively cut
off even this avenue of assistance to nonpublic schools. Following
the logic of Everson and Allen, several states had decided to as-
sume part of the salary cost of teachers of secular subjects in non-
public schools, on the condition (thought to be constitutionally re-
quired) that the teachers refrain from incorporating any religious
elements in their teaching. The effect of such programs would have
been to reduce still further the diversity of private education. If
both textbooks and teaching are stripped of their religious charac-
ter, little would be left of the religious alternative to the common
schools. In Lemon v Kurtzman,6" however, the Court held these
programs unconstitutional on the ground that the monitoring nec-
essary to ensure that the subsidized teaching is nonreligious would
entail an "excessive entanglement" between church and state. It
became evident that only forms of assistance that effectively could
not be imbued with a religious element (such as diagnostic tests,
school lunches, or the grading of standardized tests) would be per-
mitted. The effect of this decision was to reduce the opportunities
for assistance to nonpublic schools dramatically, and at the same
54 330 US 1 (1947).
"' 392 US 236 (1968).
60 403 US 602 (1971).
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time to remove the temptations created by Everson and Allen to
secularize non-public schools.6'
During the same period, in the public schools the Court was
pursuing a radicalized version of Horace Mann's program of com-
mon education. The Court warmly embraced the civic republican
ideal of the common school movement, seemingly forgetting the
multicultural constitutional ideals of Pierce and Meyer. The Court
referred to the "importance of public schools in the preparation of
individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of
the values on which our society rests,""2 described public schools as
"an 'assimilative force' by which diverse and conflicting elements
in our society are brought together,"s and endorsed the "observa-
tions of social scientists" that "the public schools . . . inculcat[e]
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system." '
The Court also insisted on the rigorous exclusion of overtly
religious elements from the curriculum, including school prayer,"
Bible reading,66 creationist biology, 7 some moments of silence for
prayer or meditation, 6  and the posting of the Ten Command-
ments.69 The principal difference between this and the approach of
the Nineteenth Century reformers is that the Court has recognized
the sectarian character of even broadly interdenominational reli-
gious exercises like the Regent's Prayer. This combination of com-
mitments-to inculcation of values and to secularism-means that
public schools are constitutionally committed to inculcating a secu-
laristic morality. The Supreme Court seems to have assumed that
a secularistic morality is neutral among religions and between reli-
' Allen, however, remains good law, with the unhappy consequence that most Catholic
schools and many other private schools use the same textbooks used in the public schools.
" Ambach v Norwick, 441 US 68, 76 (1979).
63 Id at 77.
" Id. See also Bethel School Dist. v Fraser, 478 US 675, 681-83 (1986) ("The role and
purpose of the American public school system [is to] 'prepare pupils for citizenship in the
Republic . . . . [S]chools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social or-
der.' "); Board of Educ. v Pico, 457 US 853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion per Brennan)
("local school boards must be permitted 'to establish and apply their curriculum in such a
way as to transmit community values' [and] 'there is a legitimate and substantial commu-
nity interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral,
or political.' ").
See Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962).
" See School Dist. of Abington Township v Schempp, 374 US 203 (1963).
6 See Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578 (1987).
See Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985).
6 See Stone v Graham, 449 US 39 (1980).
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gion and non-religion. This assumption is subject to the same criti-
cisms that were levelled against Mann's neutral "piety. 70
Moreover, educators and textbook publishers have taken the
Court's decisions to extremes. Recent studies under the auspices of
the Department of Education, People for the American Way,
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and the As-
sociation for Supervision and Curriculum Development have docu-
mented that the leading elementary and secondary school text-
books virtually neglect any mention of religious influences or ideas
in history, ethics, or social studies. 71 Thus, the "public values" in-
culcated by the public schools are not, in fact, the values held by
the large majority of the American public, but the values held by a
secular minority. As one commentator has observed, "[wiherever
we look-in history, social studies, reading texts, psychology, val-
ues education, the sciences both natural and social-the thrust in
the public schools is to treat religion not at all, or as irrelevant, or
as superstition. 7 1 Nothing in the Supreme Court's cases demands
this extreme result. But the logic of the Court's position, in favor
of inculcating a common morality but against any overt religious
teaching, necessarily pushes in that direction. It is hard to see how
any genuine pluralism could exist in public schools operating
under those strictures.
It is not possible, practically or theoretically, for public schools
to be "neutral" with respect to contentious questions of morality,
politics, and religion. The more the school attempts to be even-
handed, the more it will appear to endorse a position of relativism,
or worse, cynicism. Now, as in the nineteenth century, the moral-
religious position that seems most "neutral" to those in power will
almost inevitably be the position in which they themselves believe.
That is true of educational traditionalists, who view assaults on the
70 See William R. Marty, To Favor Neither Religion Nor Nonreligion: Schools in a
Pluralist Society, in Paul J. Weber, ed, Equal Separation 95 (Greenwood, 1990); George
Dent, Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S Cal L Rev 863 (May 1988); Note, The Myth
of Religious Neutrality by Separation in Education, 71 Va L Rev 127 (Feb 1985).
71 Paul C. Vitz, Religion and Traditional Values in Public School Textbooks: An Em-
pirical Study 3-7 (US Dept of Educ, 1985); Charles C. Haynes, A Teacher's Guide: Reli-
gious Freedom in America 6 (Americans United Research Foundation, 1986); O.L. Davis,
Jr., et al, Looking at History: A Review of Major U.S. History Textbooks 3-4, 11 (People for
the American Way, 1986); Educators Urge Turn to Studies About Religion, NY Times A16
(July 2, 1987) (report of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development).
72 Marty, Schools in a Pluralist Society, in Weber, ed, Equal Separation at 99. This
form of moral education has, not surprisingly, led to challenges from parents (particularly
from strong religious persuasions) who perceive it as equivalent to moral relativism or ethi-
cal individualism, which are anything but "neutral" toward their own moral-religious be-
liefs. Dent, 61 S Cal L Rev at 866-73.
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educational canon as "politicization" of education; it is true of the
adversary culture, who view more traditional moral-cultural teach-
ings as oppressive and confining; and it is true of the Supreme
Court, which views secularism as the equivalent of neutrality.
The same problem exists with respect to ethnic sources of con-
tention. A curriculum cannot please both those who wish to teach
the importance and equality of a wide variety of cultures and those
who wish to concentrate on what they consider best in Western
culture. The multiculturalism desired by African-Americans is not
the same as the multiculturalism desired by South Asians. Thor-
oughgoing multiculturalism, like thoroughgoing religious neutral-
ity, is impossible. There are too many cultures, too many lan-
guages, too many religions. They cannot all receive "equal time. 7 3
Even if they could, the message communicated to the students
would be one of moral and cultural relativism-a position no less
sectarian than the rest.
No shifts in constitutional doctrine governing the conduct of
the public schools74 can solve this problem, because it inheres in
the nature of things. The Supreme Court can alter the character of
public education, making it more religious or more secular, but it
cannot make public education genuinely more pluralistic. A com-
mon school is a common school. That is its blessing and its curse.
On the other hand, there has already been a shift in constitu-
tional doctrine regarding aid to nonpublic schools that permits
educational pluralism through parental choice. While there once
was serious doubt that an educational choice plan would be upheld
,' This is borne out by experience. For example, according to press reports, the Califor-
nia school system adopted history textbooks that sought "to accommodate every culture,"
but were immediately attacked by black, Asian, Hispanic, Islamic, Jewish, Indian, Chinese,
women's, gay and lesbian organizations, all claiming they had been slighted. Charles Brem-
ner, US Academics under Pressure to Rewrite Ethnic History, The Times (London) (Over-
seas News Section) (Oct 22, 1990). "Muslims said they should have written the chapters on
Islam; Chinese said their cruel treatment by whites had been glossed over; Jews complained
that nothing was said about persecution by Christians; homosexuals said famous gays had
not been given their due. Black historians denounced the new course as biased towards the
white, European version." Id. According to the report, "[t]he criticism in California was
surprising since the state had tried to wipe the slate clean and produce a curriculum that
drew on every culture and 'was no longer exclusively the property of white males,' as one of
the authors of the new textbooks put it. Some educators are wondering if they should give
up the whole idea of producing a single history for all Americans." Id.
74 The Supreme Court has agreed to review a case involving the constitutionality of a
nonsectarian prayer at a junior high graduation ceremony. Lee v Weisman, 908 F2d 1090
(1st Cir 1990), cart granted, 111 S Ct 1305 (1991).
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by the Supreme Court,7 5 recent decisions make it all but certain
that a genuinely neutral and nondiscriminatory program of educa-
tional choice would be sustained.
The Court has distinguished between two types of aid: "di-
rect" (meaning that the funds are allocated by government officials
directly to the recipient institutions) and "indirect" (meaning that
the funds are allocated to private individuals, and that any benefit
to institutions is a direct result of the private choices of individu-
als). If aid is direct, then the government has an obligation to en-
sure that it is not used for "specifically religious activity. ' '" 7 It fol-
lows that direct aid cannot be given to institutions so "pervasively
sectarian" that their religious and secular aspects are "inextricably
intertwined."' 7 Educational choice programs, however, would be an
instance of indirect assistance, because state agents would not allo-
cate funds directly to the institutions; rather, the voucher would go
to the parents, who would use it at the school of their choice,
whether secular or religious.
The constitutionality of an educational choice plan, then, de-
pends on the "indirect aid" precedents. The most pertinent case is
Witters v Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind, 8 a unani-
mous decision holding that public funds could be used to pay the
tuition of a student at a Bible college for training for the ministry,
pursuant to a program of vocational assistance for the blind. Jus-
tice Marshall's opinion for the Court identified several aspects of
the program as "central to our inquiry. '79 First, he noted that
"[a]ny aid provided under Washington's program that ultimately
flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genu-
inely independent and private choices" of the individual stu-
dents."0 Second, he noted that "Washington's program is 'made
available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or
public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefitted,' and is in no
way skewed toward religion.""1 Both of these factors are equally
true of educational choice plans.
" In Committee for Public Education v Nyquist, 413 US 756 (1973), the Court struck
down a program of tax deductions for tuition costs at private schools. This suggested that
other forms of indirect aid would likewise be held unconstitutional.
"' Hunt v McNair, 413 US 734, 743 (1973); Roemer v Maryland Public Works Bd., 426
US 736, 759 (1976); Bowen v Kendrick, 487 US 589, 613-15 (1988).
" Lemm v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 657 (1971); Roemer, 426 US at 759.
70 474 US 481 (1986).
79 Id at 487.
80 Id.
3, Id, quoting Nyquist, 413 US at 782-83 n 38 (1973).
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Third, Justice Marshall stressed that the Washington program
"creates no financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian
education."8 Their benefits are neither "greater nor broader" if
they "apply their aid to religious education" than if to secular pro-
grams." "[T]he fact that aid goes to individuals means that the
decision to support religious education is made by the individual,
not by the State."'
This is the crux of the matter. The principal purpose of the
Religion Clauses is to ensure that decisions about religious prac-
tice, including education, are reserved to the private realm of indi-
vidual conscience. The decision to choose religious or secular edu-
cation should be made by the individual, not by the State. The
government has no legitimate interest in discouraging free religious
choices, just as it has no legitimate interest in promoting a particu-
lar religion. Again, the educational choice idea closely resembles
the Washington program upheld in Witters. The benefits are
neither broader nor greater for parents who choose religious educa-
tion than for those who choose secular. The proposal creates no
incentive to undertake religious education; on the contrary, it is
the current system that creates a significant incentive to forego re-
ligious education.
Finally, Justice Marshall noted that "nothing in the record in-
dicates that. . . any significant portion of the aid expended under
the Washington program as a whole will end up flowing to religious
education." '8 Similarly, there is no reason to expect that any more
than a modest proportion of the aid dispensed under an educa-
tional choice plan will flow to religious schools. Furthermore, it
must also be noted that on this final point, a majority of the Court
rejected Justice Marshall's analysis. Justice Powell, joined in sub-
stantial part by four other Justices, expressed the controlling prin-
ciple as follows: "state programs that are wholly neutral in offering
educational assistance to a class defined without reference to reli-
gion do not violate the second part of the Lemon v Kurtzman
test."' Thus, even if a "significant portion" of the aid did flow to
religious schools, it would not present a constitutional problem so
" Witters, 474 US at 488, quoting Nyquist, 413 US at 785-86.'
" Id.
" Id.
88 Id.
" Witters, 474 US at 490-91; id at 490 (White concurring); id at 493 (O'Connor concur-
ring). The second part of the Lemon v Kurtzman test provides that the principle or primary
effect of a statute must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Lemon, 403 US at
612.
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long as "any benefit to religion resulted from the 'numerous pri-
vate choices of individual parents.' ,,87
Witters is only the most recent of a long line of cases in which
the Court has sustained indirect aid distributed neutrally to reli-
gious and nonreligious organizations, through the independent
choices of private individuals. In Mueller v Allen,88 the Court up-
held a Minnesota program of tax deductions for parents' expenses
incurred in obtaining education for their children, despite evidence
put forth by petitioners that a large part of these expenses were
tuition payments to private schools, most of which were religious
schools. 9 As in Witters, the decisive consideration was that the
allocation of financial assistance was determined through private,
decentralized choice. "Most importantly, the deduction is available
for educational expenses incurred by all parents, including those
whose children attend public schools and those whose children at-
tend nonsectarian private schools or sectarian private schools." 90
The program therefore was consistent with the Establishment
Clause, even assuming that tax deductions for parochial schools in-
directly paid for religious instruction.
Unlike Witters, which was unanimous, the Court was closely
divided in Mueller. But even the position of the dissenters in
Mueller supports the constitutionality of the educational choice
proposals. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion stressed that the
"vast majority of the taxpayers who are eligible to receive the ben-
efit are parents whose children attend religious schools."'" In con-
trast, those eligible for assistance under an educational choice plan
include parents whose children use secular as well as religious
schools. Even the dissenters in Mueller, then, did not take the po-
sition that parents must be categorically barred from using their
state-provided educational resources in religious settings. They
merely insisted that government programs may not be devised in
such a way that the preponderance of the benefit can be expected
to go to religious recipients.
Similarly, the Court held in Widmar v Vincent,92 that it would
not violate the Establishment Clause for a state university to make
its facilities available, without payment, to a religious group on the
87 Witters, 474 US at 491 (Powell concurring), quoting Mueller v Allen, 463 US 388,
399 (1983).
88 463 US 388.
89 Id at 400-01.
90 Id at 397 (emphasis in original).
9, Id at 405.
92 454 US 263 (1981).
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same basis as other university student groups.93 Free facilities are,
of course, a valuable benefit; and the group intended to use this
benefit for specifically religious activities, including religious teach-
ing, worship, and prayer. The Court reasoned, however, that when
benefits of this sort are open to all on an evenhanded basis,dthere
is no effect of "advanc[ing] religion. ' ' 94 "The provision of benefits
to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular
effect."95
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v Ny-
quist"6 is the case most often cited by opponents of educational
choice. Yet, the Court in Nyquist, and in Sloan v Lemon,97 struck
down programs of indirect aid to parochial education only because
the allocation formula was heavily skewed toward religious schools.
The Court in Nyquist sharply differentiated between programs in
which aid flows to "all schoolchildren" and those in which aid is
restricted to those who choose to attend private schools, which are
overwhelmingly sectarian. The Court suggested, in dictum, that it
would approve of a genuinely neutral aid program like the "G.I.
Bill," even though government funds in such a program would go
to religious institutions and would presumably support sectarian
teaching.98 A few years later, the Court summarily affirmed two
such programs.9 9 Education choice plans are, in effect, a "G.I. Bill"
for kindergarten through high ,school, and would likely sustain a
challenge under Nyquist or Sloan.
In Walz v Tax Commission,'"0 the Court held, with only one
dissent, that state property tax exemptions for religious organiza-
tions are permissible, even when the property is used "solely for
religious worship."''1 1 Emphasizing the constitutional principle of
93 Id at 270-75.
" Id at 273.
'4 Id at 274.
413 US 756 (1973).
413 US 825 (1973).
9' Nyquist, 413 US at 782 n 38 (emphasis in original). The G.I. Bill provides educa-
tional assistance for eligible veterans attending any public or private school, college, or uni-
versity. 38 USC §§ 1652 and 1681 (1988).
" Americans United for Separation of Church and State v Blanton, 433 F Supp 97 (M
D Tenn), aft'd, 434 US 803 (1977) (assistance program providing needy students with finan-
cial assistance to attend the accredited college of their choice); Smith v Board of Governors
of Univ. of North Carolina, 429 F Supp 871 (W D NC), aft'd, 434 US 803 (1977) (tuition
assistance for North Carolina residents attending independent colleges within the state, in-
cluding church-related ones).
,00 397 US 664 (1970).
1"1 Id at 666.
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"neutrality", 0 2 the Court noted that the tax benefit was provided
to churches "within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit,
quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, libraries, play-
grounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups. ' 1°8
Ih sum, the key factor under the Supreme Court's indirect aid
cases is that "the benefit of government programs and policies
[must be] generally available, on the basis of some secular crite-
rion, to a wide class of similarly situated nonreligious benefi-
ciaries.' ' 104 When the allocation of aid is determined through indi-
vidual choice and not government direction, and is not skewed in
favor of religion, the program satisfies constitutional strictures. In
such a program, there is no need to exclude religious schools, even
those that are pervasively sectarian, and no need to forbid specifi-
cally religious activities. Indeed, in each of the indirect aid cases
discussed-Witters, Mueller, Widmar, Walz, and the Nyquist dic-
tum-the recipients included pervasively sectarian organizations,
that engaged in specifically religious activities. Such choices are
not forbidden by the First Amendment, provided they are the
product of independent decisionmaking.
The Court, however, also has held that a statute is unconstitu-.
tional under the Establishment Clause if it "foster[s] an excessive
government entanglement with religion. '105 Two possible forms of
entanglement must be examined in connection with the educa-
tional choice proposal. First, the Court has frequently found the
potential for "excessive entanglement" when, in order to avoid the
"primary effect" of advancing religion, the government must moni-
tor the conduct of a recipient institution to ensure that it does not
engage in "specifically religious activities" within the funded pro-
gram. The Court stated in Aguilar: "though a comprehensive sys-
tem of supervision might conceivably prevent teachers from having
the primary effect of advancing religion, such a system would inev-
itably lead to an unconstitutional administrative entanglement be-
tween church and state."106 This form of entanglement is not
present in cases of indirect aid, where there is no constitutional
requirement that recipients -refrain from religious activities. It is
102 Id at 669.
108 Id at 673.
104 Marsh v Chambers, 463 US 783, 809 (1983) (Brennan dissenting). See also Texas
Monthly v Bullock, 109 S Ct 890, 897-99 (1989) (plurality opinion).
105 Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 612-13 (1971). See also Aguilar v Felton, 473 US
402 (1985).
10 Aguilar, 473 US at 410. See also Lemon, 403 US at 619.
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therefore not a problem with the educational choice proposal, just
as it was not a problem with the tax credits in Mueller v Allen.
The second form of entanglement is the more general interac-
tion between officials of religious organizations and agents of the
state that can occur in the course of many regulatory programs. 1 7
Entanglement of this form could result if a school's eligibility for
state aid is made conditional on meeting official educational stan-
dards. Unlike the first form of entanglement, however, this form is
not necessarily connected to financial assistance; it is just as likely
to arise from permissible assertions of the state's regulatory or po-
lice power. The criteria are the same in the one context as in the
other. '0 An educational choice program in and of itself does not
entail any additional regulation, beyond that already entailed by
accreditation. 0 9 Should future regulations lead to excessive entan-
glement, the proper remedy would be to enjoin their enforcement,
not to invalidate the choice program.
Thus, while fears of church-state constitutional problems are
often cited by opponents of educational choice, those fears are
groundless. Whatever may be the flaws in the educational choice
idea, it should be debated on its merits and not rejected on spuri-
ous constitutional grounds. In fact, far from offending the First
Amendment, an educational choice plan is much more consistent
with the pluralistic vision of the First Amendment than is granting
secular schools a monopoly of public funds."0
V. WEIGHING THE RISKS OF PLURALISM
The common school movement has run its course and no
longer can establish a coherent position in the face of the conflict-
ing demands of a diverse nation. All around us we witness its ef-
fects. It cannot teach any god because it would have to teach all
107 See, generally, Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental In-
terference with Religious Organizations, 41 Wash & Lee L Rev 347, 379-420 (1984).
108 Compare Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v Secretary of Labor, 471 US 290, 305
(1985), and NLRB v Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 US 490, 501-04 (1979) (discussing
entanglement in context of regulatory programs and citing precedents from aid programs),
with Texas Monthly, 109 S Ct at 903 (citing precedents from regulatory programs in context
of entanglement from taxation).
I" The only involvement between agents of the state and agents of the school entailed
by most educational choice proposals is that the latter must notify the state that the grant
has been received. This is surely a minor and inconsequential involvement. See, for example,
Jimmy Swaggart v Board of Equalization, 110 S Ct 688, 698 (1990) ("administrative and
recordkeeping burdens do not rise to a constitutionally significant level" of entanglement).
110 See, generally, Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions
and Religious Schools, 104 Harv L Rev 989 (1991).
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gods; it cannot teach any culture because it would have to teach all
cultures. When it departs from these principles it becomes narrow-
minded and oppressive. The common school movement now
teaches our children, unintentionally, to be value-less, culture-less,
root-less, and religion-less. It can no longer achieve its crowning
purpose of providing a unifying moral culture in the face of our
many differences.
Freedom of choice offers the promise of a return to moral edu-
cation, which is indispensable to the political health of the repub-
lic, without a sacrifice of minority opinion. With educational
choice, each school could teach from a coherent moral-cultural per-
spective-one that is chosen by its student body. Of course, educa-
tional choice is risky. It runs the risk that some will choose a moral
education that is pernicious, and that many will choose ethnically
and religiously particularistic alternatives that might exacerbate
already-dangerous divisions. I suspect these fears are overblown,
however, just as the similar fears of religious pluralism were over-
blown in the eighteenth century. With parents making the deci-
sions, how likely is it that many will choose alternatives that are
demonstrably worse than the results of the present system?
It seems probable that parents will want what is good for their
children-recognizing that they will evaluate the good in light of
their own traditions and cultures."1 It also seems probable that
what is good for people in one tradition will, as to most matters of
serious importance, bear some resemblance to what is good, sim-
ply. Milwaukee's experiment with black male schools could pro-
duce racist male supremacists. But consider this: If a person is
brought up to be a good black male in an honorable minority tradi-
tion, isn't it likely that he will also be brought up to be a good
person and a good citizen? Why would we doubt that an education
in the excellences of the black male would be so dissimilar to an
education in the excellences common to all? The United States is
"I In this respect, parental choice is far less risky than schemes that devolve power
upon community leaders or subgroups. Parents do not often subject their children to social
or ideological experimentation, and are more likely to value education that will prepare
their children for happy and productive lives within the wider culture than to use education
for fissiparous social objectives. See Tang, The African American Academy at A21 (cited in
note 2) (quoting Rickie Malone, planning coordinator for the Afrocentric academy in Seat-
tle, as saying "African-American parents are quite traditional in what they want for their
kids. Most stay away from alternative schools. They want structure."); Debra Viadero, Bal-
timore Class Tests Theory of Providing "Positive Role Model" for Young Black Boys, 10
Educ Week 1, 17 (Feb 13, 1991) (quoting Richard Boynton, teacher of a black male class in
Baltimore, as saying "All these kids are saying. . . is teach me, discipline me, and love me
. . . . In here, . . . we're always talking about respect, responsibility, and self-control.").
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not a polis. There is no such thing as the one model of a good
citizen. The genius of America has been to teach people to be good
citizens of the whole by first becoming good citizens of a
part-good citizens of their family, of their community, of their
church. Freedom of choice is risky. But isn't the alternative risky
as well?
The irony is that pluralistic education might well turn out to
be more unifying than common education ever could be. Protes-
tants, Catholics, Jews, and Muslims all disagree about important
questions of religion and morality-so much so that no common
curriculum that addresses such questions could be acceptable to
all. But Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and Muslims all agree that
there is a morality, that there are objective standards of right and
wrong that transcend the mere preferences and choices of the indi-
vidual. If Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and Muslims are educated
together, the most likely compromise is a moral-religious relativism
that is the antithesis of a common morality. If they are educated in
their own traditions, it would not be surprising to find that the
resulting moral education would have striking commonalities.
In conclusion, I believe that it is time to adopt a genuine mul-
ticultural approach to education, based on parental choice and
control. When we formed a nation out of a continent of diverse
cultures and peoples, when we guaranteed diversity and freedom of
belief, we committed ourselves to a multicultural polity. The com-
peting civic republican ideal is not practicable in a nation of this
sort. It will either impose a single moral-cultural vision at the ex-
pense of the minorities, or no moral-cultural vision at all (if such a
thing is possible), at the expense of coherence and value. The cur-
rent system is not working. Why not try choice?

